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Abstract 
 
Rainfall continues to be a major risk confronted by the dryland farmers in semi-arid tropics of 
India. Through the years, dryland farmers experience an increasingly erratic rainfall and frequent 
occurrence of droughts. Crop yield and farm income are highly correlated with quantum and 
distribution of rainfall thereby livelihoods of resource poor farmer are at risk.  Rainfall insurance, 
a type of Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS), was introduced as a risk covering 
mechanism to extreme rainfall events and to reduce hassles in operationalization of other crop 
insurance schemes. This study documents rainfall insurance scheme and its operational 
modalities such as eligibility criteria, payment of premium, benefit structure and payouts, and 
technical hassles. It examined the hypothesis that low spread of rainfall insurance was linked 
with the situation where prospective buyers were unable to relate the product to their regular 
exposure. This study also underlines incongruity comparing the variation in longitudinal actual 
village data and reference weather data (mandal level
3
) that were used to calculate strike, exit 
and payouts to the farmers across six villages of semi-arid tropics (SAT) region. It identified 
several challenges on the ground in its capacity to cover risk among the farmers. The challenges 
include lack of proper awareness among farmers, absence of reliable weather datasets, 
misinformation on insurance contract and processes, exclusion of high risky crops from the 
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 Mandal is the sub-district administrative level in the state of Telangana, India 
rainfall insurance coverage. Real time calculation of risk benefits with existing policy found that 
existing design cannot appropriate to meet the loss, if incurred during the climate extremes. 
Hence, there is a need to relook at the insurance policy design in terms of efficiency. The study 
also argued that with continuous government support and by drawing on both quasi government 
and private players into the process for greater transparency and design to improve effectiveness 
of this initiative.  
Key words: WBCIS, Rainfall Insurance, risk management, semi-arid tropics, dryland farming, 
India. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The semi-arid tropical environment in India is highly vulnerable in terms of weather risks and it 
expects to further exacerbate in the future. The global climate models have predicted the frequent 
incidences of extreme events such as drought, flood etc. and with increased weather variability in 
the region (IPCC, 2013). Hence, steps towards improving the adaptive capacity of rural farmers 
to climate risks are crucial in the semi-arid region of the world. The consequences of risk will 
result in crop income reduction, selling of assets such as, livestock, land, in order to smoothen 
consumption expenditure (Bantilan and Anupama, 2006; Bidinger et al. 1991). Furthermore, this 
anticipation of losses also affects household behavior, causing farmers that are unprotected to 
avoid investment, innovation and risk taking (Hill, 2009) and underinvest in high return, but also 
in high volatility projects, limiting household ability to grow out of poverty (Dercon and 
Christiansen, 2007). Hence, farmers’ should be equipped with the capacity to absorb these losses 
in the future (Larson et al., 2004). Sufficient support should be provided through different 
policies and safety net programs that prevent further deterioration of poverty levels from the 
impacts of climatic risks. Therefore, investigating on current options and to understand the risk-
coping potential is necessary.  
The agricultural insurance is considered an important mechanism to effectively address the risk 
resulting from unfavorable natural events (Bakker, 1990; Raju and Chand, 2007). This 
envisioned as means of protecting the farmers against financial losses due to uncertainties and 
agricultural losses arising from all unforeseen perils beyond their control. Agricultural insurance 
aid farmers to stabilize farm income and investment and it guard against financial losses due to 
natural hazards. The agricultural insurance includes such as crop insurance, weather based 
insurances that are operational in the region. Farmers participating in a crop insurance scheme 
pay a premium each year and in which yields per hectare are below a certain level, indemnities 
are paid to the farmer. An insurance payout is triggered if measured crop yields from the area fall 
below a certain threshold, based on crop cutting experiments conducted on a sample of 
monitored selected plots. However, there are several operational constraints in crop insurance 
including limitations in product design, the procedural complexities in assessment of loss, high 
administrative cost, inaccurate assessment of loss and inappropriate compensation to losses 
depending on crops (Gine et al. 2008; AFC, 2011). This has led in devising weather based crop 
insurance to insure participants (farmers) against unfavorable weather events such as rainfall 
insurance. Weather based Crop Insurance uses weather parameters as ‘proxy’ for crop yields in 
compensating the cultivators for deemed crop losses. In the rainfall insurance the volume of 
indemnity paid back to insured farmer only depends on the weather variable. It is different from 
crop insurance as it is based on the fact that weather conditions affect crop production even when 
a cultivator has taken all the care to ensure good harvest.  
Broad objective of the study is to understand effectiveness of the rainfall insurance scheme in 
dryland regions in India. Specific objectives of the study are: (a) to review the operational 
modalities of the rainfall insurance scheme in India such as eligibility criteria, payment of 
premium, benefit structure and payouts, and technical hassles; (b) to compute and compare 
rainfall index at various administrative level i.e. District, Mandal and Village level; and (c) to 
analyze the risk minimizing ability, effectiveness and constraints in implementation of the 
rainfall insurance.  
The paper is structured as follows. After this introductory section, Section 2 describes the 
approach followed in this study. Comprehensive review of existing knowledge about the rainfall 
insurance scheme particularly its design, operational modalities, process and distribution of the 
scheme is provided in Section 3. Section 4 details out the rainfall insurance scheme, experience 
of the insured farmers and puts forward some suggestions for improvement of the rainfall 
insurance scheme. Conclusions are provided in the last section. 
2. THE STUDY APPROACH 
The study includes extensive review of research literatures on rainfall insurance scheme carried 
out in the region. The information on the operational modalities of the rainfall insurance was 
collected through key informants’ interview from the insurance provider organization 
(Agricultural Insurance Company of India), stakeholders (farmers) and facilitating organization 
(microfinance institute). With an aim to understand ground level working of rainfall insurance, 
primary data were collected from Dharmapur village of Mahbubnagar district of Telangana state 
of India. The main aim was to know the perception, awareness and extent of benefits accrued by 
farming community, who availed weather based crop insurance scheme (WBCIS), rainfall 
insurance in this case among different farm group. Long term weather data analysis was carried 
out using data collected by ICRISAT through its village level studies (VLS) and village 
dynamics studies (VDS) program. Both village and taluk/mandal level data sets were used to 
explore the difference in the rainfall in terms of quantum and distribution in the village and 
reference weather station (RFS).  
3. RAINFALL INSURANCE IN INDIA 
3.1. Rainfall Insurance: Genesis, Evolution and Design 
The rainfall insurance was piloted in 2003, in semi-arid tropics of India, with assistance from 
World Bank. The design of insurance contract was initially developed by ICICI Lombard ICICI 
Lombard General Insurance Company and piloted with BASIX, a Hyderabad-based 
microfinance institution (Hazell et al. 2010; Bryla and Syroka, 2007). Later, the product was 
being available in other parts of the country with more competing firms started marketing the 
products. These include Agricultural Insurance Company of India (AIC), IFFCO-Tokio General 
etc. The rainfall insurance scheme covers crops against rainfall deficiency during the primary 
cropping season i.e. monsoon (Kharif, June to Sept-Oct). The contracts are designed in three 
consecutive phases of the crop growth period that are contiguous and sequential, with each 35-40 
days in duration corresponding to agricultural phases
4
. The total policy duration is for 110 days. 
The policy coverage day coincides with the onset and not necessary to be June 1. It may be noted 
here that June 1 is considered as south west monsoon start date in India. It is expected that 
monsoon hits Kerala coast on June 1.  The day 1 of the policy cover is computed as per the 
hydrological definition. According to this definition, onset of the monsoon will be considered on 
the day when cumulative rainfall from June 1st will be 50 mm or more. However, if the above 
conditions are not met in June, then rainfall insurance policy invariably starts on July 1. 
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Insurance covers all three agricultural phases i.e. sowing (35 days), vegetative growth (35 days) 
and harvest (40-45 days). In the first two phases, payouts are linked to rainfall deficit and the 
third phase it is reversed. This means in the first two phases the payout is based on deficit rainfall 
and during the third phase it is based of rainfall excess. If the rainfall during the period is below 
particular threshold or ‘strike’, then the farmer will get the payouts and maximum at which they 
can receive the indemnity is called ‘exit. The process of payoff including the strike and exit are 
given in the Figure 1. For the insurance abide with the standard definitions of rainy days in the 
aggregate rainfall calculation
5
. This calculation is required to satisfy the condition of start of the 
policy period. The quantities of rainfall received decide on the day 1 of the policy period and are 
divided into two parts: Policy activation rainfall and Index rainfall. Policy activation rainfall is 
the quantity of rainfall that contributes towards the requirement of first 50mm rainfall condition 
and Index rainfall is the balance rainfall of the day. 
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 Figure 1: - The relationship between payoffs and phase of rainfall
*
.  
 
 
3.2 Operational Modalities 
The rainfall insurance operates on the concept of “Area Approach”. The scheme operates in 
selected notified reference unit area which is considered as unit area of insurance for the purpose 
of acceptance of risk and assessment of compensation. Hence, all insured-cultivator of the 
notified crop in the notified reference unit area is deemed to be on par so their terms of insurance 
coverage and assessment of compensation is concerned (Government of India directive dated 1st 
November 2013). In brief, for the purpose of indemnities paid, a reference unit area is linked to a 
reference weather station, weather data and accordingly claims would be processed.  
Rainfall measurement and reference weather station: For particular region reference weather 
station data sets are used to process claims and compensation. The indemnity payment is directly 
linked to the rainfall received. The policy provider get rainfall data from the Indian 
meteorological department (IMD) or the automatic gauges maintained by the private players. 
There has been speculation on the station where rainfall data was used in calculating the strike. 
The insurance product is offered to households based on the gauge located not more than 20 km 
from the village (Gine et al. 2008). However, with the maximum available weather proximity 
data, insurance provider block/tehsil level weather data with an assumption block/tehsil level 
weather data, by and large reflects the condition of the experienced farmers (AIC, 2014). In 
addition, if data is missing for the particular region the station data that are close the reference 
weather station should be used.  
Calculation of ‘strike’ & ‘Exit’: The calculation of strike and exit is considered to be the most 
critical parameters for a weather insurance contract. The interplay of these values with the 
indemnity payment rates (or notional) control a trade-off between the protection level inherent in 
the weather insurance contract and the process of setting strike and exit determine the indemnity 
payment rates where the greatest dilution takes place in a weather insurance contract. However, 
the procedure in calculating this level is not transparent and unavailable to public for cross 
validation. Hence, there exit a high level of ambiguity among the stake holder and its entrusted 
support on reducing the risk of the vulnerable farmers (Shaik, 2013). 
3.3 Distribution of Insurance Contracts and Process
6
 
The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) in 2005 legally recognized the 
importance of non-governmental organization, micro finance institutions and self-help groups in 
the involvement of marketing of the scheme. In the piloted area, local marketing, distribution and 
transactions were performed by the development organization for example BASIX, a large micro 
finance institution had a network of local agents as they called as livelihood services Agents 
(LSA’s). These organizations received a commission for their service to cover marketing cost 
and payout disbursements. This service cost is provided by the provider along with the 
government support. At the end of the insurance coverage period, the provider organization 
calculated payouts based on the rainfall. Currently, this insurance scheme had been made 
mandatory for farmers who available credits from banks or financial institutions with sectioned 
credit for particular crops. The cost of inputs expected to be incurred in raising the crop and the 
premium is declared before the season and for the small and marginal farmers with support from 
both central and state governments. The farmer has to pay 50% of the insurance premium and the 
remaining premium is subsidized equally by the central and state government. The premium 
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rates are based on the ‘expected loss’ which is depend on the weather trends for the region. In the 
first trigger, the payout will increase with the reduction in rainfall. For each ‘mm’ reduction in 
rainfall the payout increases along the slope till the second trigger the payout is fixed with 
respect to the premium paid. The premium patterns in rainfall insurance are different with 
respect to the crops. 
The insurance product is availed by the cultivators before the cover risk period. It is notified in 
advance before the risk commencement period. The entire process from the communication of 
the product to the final settlement of the product is given in Figure 2. The product 
communication starts one or two month before the commencement of the insurance cover period. 
Once the farmer is ready and the documentation process start including the collection of 
premium and other details. The premium is collected and further processing and information are 
exchanged. The information such as the extent of crops grown, the phase to be insured (it can be 
single phase or even all the three phases) etc. and accordingly the policy is issued. Once the crop 
season passes, the claim is intimated to the provider by submission of claim. The claim is then 
processed by the insurance provider and the settlement is done within 45 days of end of the 
season. Usually, the service personnel come to the village and distribute the indemnities. They 
mention to the policy holder the rainfall data and the amount to be received.  
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Figure 2: - Step-wise rainfall insurance process at village level 
3.4. Governmental directives and support for the rainfall insurance 
The governments (central and state) have been vociferously supporting this scheme with subsidy 
on the premium to promote better uptake of the insurance and minimize the risk caused by the 
variable rainfall in the region (Table 1). As per the recent circular on the directives of 
government, the weather based index insurance is implemented through the state run 
Agricultural insurance company (AIC)
7
 and the enlisted private companies. The target area and 
crop to be insured is under the decision of the state government concerned. The government had 
made mandatory for the loanee farmer but is also available for the non-loanee farmer with 
government support. It is also directed to the insurance provider that the sum insured should be 
broadly equivalent to the cost of cultivation along with flexibility among the non-loanee on the 
sum insured (GOI, 2013). They have also capped the premium rates i.e. 10% in Kharif and 8% 
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year before to manage the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS), started to deal in index insurance. 
during Rabi for food crops and oil seeds. The area to be targeted and the reference weather 
station is pre-notified by the State Level Coordination Committee on crop insurance, which is 
supposed to be reflective representative weather data. The insurance coverage can be through the 
existing network of financial institution at the grass root level includes district central 
cooperative banks, commercial banks, regional rural bank and also through their nodal agencies. 
There is also direction that the insurance would be accepted till commencement of the risk period 
and no insurance coverage is allowed once the risk period begins.  
Table 1. Payable premium slab of rainfall insurance  
Source: G.O.I., 2013. 
As per the recent government directive issued on 1 November 2013, the level of support through 
the subsidies on premium (Table 1). The subsidies have been essential and they are supported by 
the government for the committed social objectives. The government supports this program not 
only the part of the premium, but also most of the delivery service costs and also aggregate 
losses over the period of time. The number of insurer and the government share is being on rise 
from the inception of the pilot scheme in India (Figure 3 and 4). The government’s national 
budgetary allocation in the crop insurance scheme is in the tune of 600 crores. However, there 
Crops Premium payable by the insured cultivator 
Wheat 1.5% or actuarial rate, whichever is less 
Other crops (cereals, millets, 
pulses and oilseeds) 
2% or actuarial rate, whichever is less 
Horticultural Crops UPTO 2% - No subsidy 
>2-5% - subject to minimum net premium of 2% payable 
by farmer 
 >5-8% - 40%, subject to minimum net premium of 3.75% 
payable by farmer 
 >8% - 50%, subject to minimum net premium of 4.8% & 
max 6% payable by farmer 
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have been rise in central support in insurance sector in India. In 2013-14 there has been 128% 
rise in budget allocation from 2012-13 (Figure 5). 
 
Source:- GOI, 2014 
Figure 3:- Cumulative statistics of weather based insurance scheme of India (2007-2013) 
. 
Source: - GOI, 2014. 
Figure 5:- Cumulative statistics of weather based insurance scheme of India (2007-2013) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Payout scheme for cotton crop in India in phase I, II and III, Madgul mandal of 
Mahabubnagar district, Telangana State, India in 2014. 
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Among the semi-arid states of India, the highest percentage of insured farmer and area is Andhra 
Pradesh (now Telangana and Andhra Pradesh); Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. (Figure 6). With the directive of the government, state level committee decides on the 
crops to be considered under this scheme (Table 2). The crops considered under this insurance 
scheme may include cereals (Ragi, maize, sorghum etc.), pulses (black gram, green gram, 
soybean, sunflower etc.), oil seeds (ground nut, sunflower, castor etc.). The Rabi crops are also 
considered under the scheme where the weather parameter is not rainfall. 
 
Table 2:- Crops that are come under pilot weather based crop insurance scheme 
Source: GOI, 2013 
 
 Kharif Rabi 
Andhra  
Pradesh 
Groundnut, castor, Cotton, Red Chilly, 
Sweet lime, Oil palm & Tomato 
Mango, Banana & Cashew nut 
Karnataka Ragi (RF), Maize (RF), Sorghum (RF), 
Tur (RF), Black gram (RF), Green gram 
(RF), Soybean (RF), Sunflower (RF), 
Groundnut (RF), Potato (Irri & RF), 
Cotton (Irri), Cotton (RF & Irri), Onion 
(RF), Chilly (Irri & RF), Grapes & 
Banana 
Sorghum (Irri & RF), Wheat 
(Irri & RF), Bengal gram (Irri 
& RF), Potato (Irri), Grapes & 
Mango 
Maharashtra Orange, Guava & Sweet Orange Grapes, Banana, Sweet 
Orange, Pomegranate, Guava 
& Mango 
Rajasthan  Pearl millet, Sorghum, Maize, Green 
gram, Moth, Black gram, Guar, Sesame, 
Castor, Groundnut & Cotton 
Wheat, Barley, Gram, 
Mustard, Tara Mira, Cumin, 
Isabgol, Fenugreek, Coriander, 
Aonla, Potato, Kinnow, lentil 
& Pea 
00.5
1
1.5
2
Andhra pradesh Karnataka Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Rajasthan
Average area/Farmers insured
Claim Ratio (Claim received/Premium)
Farmers benefitted
Source:- GOI, 2014. 
Figure 6. Percentage contribution from states in terms of number of farmer and area insured 
(2007-2013) 
4. RAINFALL INDEX INSURANCE  
4.1 Reference Rainfall vs Actual Rainfall in the Village   
Analysis of long term climatic data undertaken by the National Rainfed Area Authority 
(NRAA) showed that on an average drought occurs once in every three years in the SAT 
region of India. Drought occurrence ranges between once in two years in western Rajasthan 
and once in 5 years in northern Madhya Pradesh (Figure 7).  
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Source GOI, 2009 
Figure 7:- Frequency of occurrence of drought in the semi-arid region of India  
We have analyzed the mandal level rainfall data (maximum available data) were taken from 
the mandal rainfall station, wherein this rainfall dataset are used to calculate the payout as per 
the term sheet design of the insurance. We have also analyzed the village rainfall data for six 
villages located in Telangana and Maharashtra. In India, the spread and density of weather 
station are minimally at mandal/taluk level. However, the availability of these data sets is 
only for the last two decades. As for designing the product, long term data sets are needed 
along with greater distribution of weather network. The minimum available weather 
information for majority of the villages in semi-arid region is the mandal/taluk level weather 
station. This station is taken as the reference weather station in designing the product and 
payouts. The past studies had the apprehension of not perfectly correlated (<75%) with 
rainfall in the village/plot level. The relationship between measured rainfall and crop yields 
vary considerable based on the bio-physical and socio-economic factors of the households. 
We have carried out a correlation analysis of the village and mandal level rainfall data. 
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Estimate correlation coefficient was high (0.75). However, we need to see this in proper 
perspective. That is, eligibility criteria depend on mm of rainfall. Therefore, even we are able 
to be correct in 75 percent cases, we are likely to predict the village rainfall condition in a 
wrong manner for 25 percent cases. In other words, one out of four predictions may be 
incorrect.   Thus, the long term village level rainfall data sets confirm that the village level 
rainfall data and reference weather station (mandal data) do not correlate satisfactorily 
(Figure 8). Hence, this could under and overestimate the proportional loss experienced by the 
farmer. The cumulative distribution curves drawn showed an unequal variance (p one tail = 
0.28) with minimum correlation of rainfall in village and mandal level data sets (Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 8:- Experimental correlation of kharif rainfall data observed in the villages and their 
respective mandal (2005-2012) 
 
Source: - VDSA, 2014. 
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Figure 9 Cumulative distribution function curve of rainfall received during the kharif season 
(2005-2012) at villages and their corresponding mandal. 
Source: VDSA, 2014 
4.2 Real time analysis of insurance payoffs. 
A real time payoff was calculated hypothetically for the insured farmers in the cotton crop in 
Mahbubnagar district of Telangana state. The terms and condition of policy catered by the 
Agricultural Insurance Company in the district (Annexure 1) were taken as terms to calculate 
Desirable Payoff (A2)
INR:- 24061 per ha
Ideal Payoff (C2)
INR: 49401 per ha
0
10000
20000
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50000
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R
Calculation based on village level data _Dokur village
Calculation based on mandal data of dokur village
Calculation based on village level data _Aurepalle village
Calculation based on mandal data of Aurepalle village
the payoff for seven years using weather data of both mandal and village level. These payoffs 
are compared with the actual cost of cultivation for the state (GOI, 2011).  
 
Figure 10:- Payoffs are calculated as per the AIC policy term for the Cotton crop. The 
payoffs are compared with the standard cost of cultivation i.e. desired payoff (A2) and Ideal 
payoff (C2). 
 
As per the cost of cultivation data for the cotton crop, the maximum payoff that could be 
received is 26,000 per ha which is slightly higher than the desirable payoff (INR: 24061). 
Hence, if there is very severe drought as per the condition of the policy they will not able to 
cover the cost incurred by farmer. The cost include total operation and family labor cost. The 
ideal payoff i.e. the cost C2 (INR: 49401) is still far to achieve. If the payoff could cover 
desirable cost, if could aid to keep them to cultivation (Figure 10). However, the profit loss is 
invariably not covered by the design. During this period of analysis, the years 2009 and 2011 
are drought years and the pay offs are even less than 50 % of the desirable payoff (A2) 
calculated using village level rainfall datasets. The payoff calculated using mandal and 
village level rainfall datasets, the pay offs are often less than 10 % of the desirable payoffs. 
Furthermore, these villages experiences drastic retrieval of groundwater over the years with 
dried off tanks and failed bore wells. It further weakens the farmers’ capacity to cope.  
4.3 Rainfall Insurance: Farmers’ experiences  
To know the experiences of the farmers we had conducted focus group discussions with the 
farmers of Dharmapur village located in Mahbubnagar district of Telangana state. From the 
focus group discussion, it was evident that farmers are willing to avail the rainfall insurance 
that was catered to the farmers
8
. These farmers were availing rainfall insurance scheme from 
2007 -2010. In Andhra Pradesh, the castor growing farmers were only able to participate in 
the insurance program. The total premium paid was around 12% of the total sum insured and 
the premium was subsidized 50% by the government. The maximum claim limit was 
1000INR
9
 per unit
10
 for each phase with a premium of INR120. The premiums paid by the 
farmer in all the three phases were not equal and the highest premium was charged for the 
final phase. Final phase is economically important phase with respect to economic output. 
Insurance product was catered to the farmers through a micro finance company
11
 and a local 
bank. Field level worker came to the village and explained about the new scheme regarding 
the premium and the return. They came twice first to issue insurance and later to distribute 
payouts. Main criteria was to have the area of castor, they confirm the land sown from the 
land passbook
12. They didn’t physically go to the field to confirm the farmers claim. It was 
not linked with loan availed by the farmer, however, the crop insurance was made 
compulsory by the finance institutions that distribute credit to the farmer. The payouts are 
distributed on time within 15 days of end of policy period. Farmers claimed that they showed 
the rainfall data and said this will be the amount of payouts but not really made to understand 
how they are calculated. Even information on the calculation of strike and exit are also not 
well explained to the farmers. Farmer find the present system have less coordination with the 
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 1 Unit = 1 acre 
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 Micro finance company is BASIX; local bank is Krishna Bima Samruddhi Bank 
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 Land passbook only shows the area owned by the farmer 
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Government Department
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governmental department and the insurance providers as the major source of information for 
them is through fellow farmers or relatives (Figure 11). The question were posed to farmers 
whether they are willing to take the insurance for the coming years?, they want the insurer to 
cater the product to them and also to cover other dryland crops groundnut, cotton etc. Even 
though, entire three insured year nobody received the maximum policy insured as the rainfall 
was not severe drought years. Farmers are not aware about the support from the government 
in terms of premium share. They feel that government should encourage the rainfall insurance 
option among the farmer with greater coverage and including more crops that are of high 
input and risky. They have apprehension towards the loss rate provided by the insurance 
company. In 2010, loss rate is INR10 per mm for all the three phases.  
Figure 11:- Source of information on agricultural insurance for the farmers in the region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: - VDSA, 2014 
4.4 Risk minimizing potential and constraints  
Our initial analysis corroborates the previous study on the limitations of the rainfall insurance 
among the rural communities. Past studies identified through household surveys that the 
potential of risk reduction, risk on their main income source (harvest income) and also advice 
from their fellow farmers are the main drivers in buying of rainfall insurance. The identified 
reasons for minimum penetration of the insurance among the households does lack of proper 
understand about the product, limitation of cash to pay premium and the limited reliable and 
acceptable rainfall data (Table 3). There have been increasing level of take up in other arid 
region of India such as Gujarat (Cole et al. 2010) during the initial years driven by support 
from government and non-governmental agencies.  
Table 3:- Constraints associated with limited scaling up of rainfall insurance 
Identified constraints References 
1. Imperfect correlation with actual rainfall and 
rainfall data considered 
Gine et al. 2008; AFC, 2011;  
2. Unsatisfactory correlation between rainfall and 
farm household income 
Gine et al. 2008 
3. Through information and education about the 
product on its risk mitigating potential 
Gine et al. 2012; AFC, 2011 
4. Price and liquidity constraints Gine et al. 2012; Binswanger-Mkhize, 
2012; GOI, 2014 
5.Lacking trust among farmers and insurance 
provider 
Gine et al. 2012; Binswanger-Mkhize, 
2012 
We expect that there will be increased uptake if they convince that this scheme have 
satisfactory risk coverage of their enterprise with minimum investment. It is also argued that 
increased risk cover will enable these farmers to re-orient their decisions towards more 
profitable and riskier crops. The indemnity received by the farmers seldom correlate to the 
actual household income loss, being the other main constraint to satisfy the apprehension of 
the farmer. With support from the government, minimal participation of poor households 
main due to out of target region and possibly due to lack of initial premium payment. Low 
correlation of reference weather station rainfall data to actually experienced in the micro 
level. With minimum rain gauges and minimum rainfall measurement, rainfall is likely to be 
different from the rainfall measured Presence of ambiguity on the product design and 
mechanism among the farmer with minimum on how the calculation of pay outs are 
calculated, on other information etc. are minimum. Absence of efficient extension mechanism 
on the ground and this had been identified a major reason for minimum impact in uptake of 
the rainfall insurance product (Table 3). Confidence and trust building among farmers and 
service providers is identified factor in taking this product. For example, in Gujarat the 
rainfall insurance product was success because it was marketed through already existing 
NGO that had good rapport with the farmers.   
We find evidence of change in the total farming expenditures by households; a substitution 
from less risky subsistence crop towards higher-risk, higher-return cash crops in the region 
(Cole et al. 2012). Even though, the vulnerable households over the years are taking 
unwarranted steps as risk-management and risk-coping strategy that includes self-insurance 
via savings and informal mechanisms but this always are not sufficient in their path towards 
sustainable livelihood. A support mechanism is always advisable for the risk farmers and it 
will be welcomed by them. The allocative farming efficiency and farmer income could be 
significantly improved by the introduction of innovative financial instruments. There is keen 
interest among the farmer to insure their crops so they act as financial cushion to loss 
incurred by climate extremes. Through government support have certainly given an impetus 
to WBCIS in India particularly rainfall insurance in the arid and semi-arid region.  Under the 
ambit of WBCIS, the financial support of the government has been well complemented by a 
fairly lenient regulatory environment; conducive during the initial stage of the scheme in 
recent time. From a development economics perspective, studies have suggested that an 
incomplete insurance would be an important constraint on development.  Looking at the risk-
reducing potential of the WBCIS, this can be viewed at different perspective that includes 
farm management decisions, economics, bio-physical, farm decision economics etc. 
However, to explore the efficacy one can undertake any one perspective. Recently, 
introduction of crop simulation models and bio-economic analysis to predict the yield loss 
and to minimize the correlation gap between actual yield loss. This could aid them to 
standardize the policy design to ensure greater impact on risk reduction. In the systematic 
review of literature, there has been no evidence that rainfall insurance will impact on 
investment, consumption-smoothing, or welfare (Cole 2013). However, it is certainly been 
difficult to rule out the hypothesis that rainfall insurance is ineffective, there are a number of 
reasons it may be particularly difficult to identify a causal chain between access to insurance 
and outcomes. In late 2000’s there have been increasing level of insurers in the region that 
also include states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat. Initial information from the farmer that 
if the farmer has substantial risk insurance coverage they will adjust the investment decision 
more riskier and profitable crops. It has also been argued that agricultural insurance in India 
has not made much headway even though the need to protect Indian farmers from agriculture 
variability has been a continuing concern of agriculture policy. Despite these strategies, 
vulnerability to poverty remains to be highly risky. Binswanger (2012) argued that other 
policies such as employment guarantee scheme would be preferred by the poor farmer and 
have better adaptation potential. It spreads the crop losses over space and time and helps 
farmers make less investment in agriculture. The disadvantage of index insurance is the 
potential basis risk between the rainfall index and the actual income loss suffered by the 
household. This will be greater when the distance between the insured household and the rain 
gauge is larger, and also small number of farmers who are able to reach the insurance systems 
have stepped back as there is no transparency in settling of claims and if at all there are 
settlements, it takes years by that time calamity has taken its toll. The three biggest 
challenges being the scaling-up affordable weather insurance are: a)  designing a weather 
index with higher predictive capability to proxy crop losses taking into account the inter-farm 
variability at an acceptable level of disaggregation b)  the large ‘basis risk’ inherent in the 
rainfall index which is the most preferred and widely-adopted weather index in India. c) 
Products available have been skewed towards the major Kharif commercial crops in the 
region and affordable weather insurance for Rabi and other horticultural crops are lacking in 
the state. This initial assessment recommends in-depth analysis on understanding the strength 
and weakness together with economic gain and payout frequency and phases insured by the 
farmers. A promising way to manage the risks associated with climate change is community-
based adaptation  which can empower communities and generate synergies with greater 
poverty reduction and sustainable development objectives (Heltberg et al., 2009) and the 
planning should be prop-poor centric and aimed uplift the poor on a faster pace than the non-
poor. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The study reviews the design and operation modalities of the rainfall insurance scheme at 
micro level in minimizing risk among the rainfed farmers of semi-arid tropics of India. There 
exist an enormous potential of the rainfall insurance scheme in addressing the needs of the 
farming community which can mitigate the adverse impacts of rainfall uncertainties. There is 
need to amend the scheme in terms of methodical transparency, reference weather station, 
awareness and farmers trust building in addressing the existing challenges. Appropriate steps 
need to undertake with greater government interventions to enable greater risk coverage and 
effective implementation of the scheme.  
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Annexure 1. 
The term sheet of the AIC for the Mahabubnagar district of Telangana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
